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ABSTRACT
The norm to protect the public core of the internet, originally
advocated by the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government
Policy, can be operationalised in two ways. Both a layered approach
and a functional approach to defining the public core of the
internet provide productive ways to discuss safeguarding the
functionality and integrity of the core logical and physical
infrastructure of the internet from unwarranted state interventions.
The article further discusses the tensions between the concept of
‘the public core of the internet’ and those of state sovereignty and
national security. It describes two tiers of objection to the protection
of the core internet infrastructure and suggests ways to mitigate
them. It concludes that even though there are no easy answers to
national security in the cyber age, in the long run, reducing
ambiguity in cyberspace will benefit all states. Lifting the public core
of the internet out of that ambiguity would be a good starting point.
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1. Introduction
This article engages with some of the arguments and discussions about the concept of the
public core of the internet and the proposed norm to protect it that was laid down in the
2015 report The Public Core of the Internet: An International Agenda for Internet Governance
by the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (Broeders 2015). Since then, I
have debated the concept in various venues and conferences across the world, and can
now offer answers to some of the questions and criticisms that have been raised. This
article draws on the original report, but can be read separately as the main concepts are
explained briefly below. The article limits itself to the role of the state in relation to the pro-
tection of the public core of the internet. Obviously other actors – such as private companies
and other non-state actors – can play a vital role in inflicting damage on or protecting the
public core of the internet but they are not the focus of this article.
Section 2 will briefly set out the concept of the public core of the internet as introduced
in the report and will highlight how the concept has been taken up in other initiatives and
by other public and private actors. Section 3 outlines two modes of operationalising what
the public core is or, more accurately, what should be covered by the concept. It describes
a layered approach and a functional approach to defining the public core of the internet.
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Section 4 deals with two of the main objections to the idea of the public core that I have
encountered in recent debates. The first is the sovereignty objection, i.e. the public core of
the internet is part and parcel of the Westphalian world, is not truly global in a legal sense
and is therefore subject to national sovereignty. The second is the national security objec-
tion, i.e. why would states limit their sovereignty by agreeing to a norm of non-interven-
tion when there is no certainty that others will adhere to that norm as well? Both
objections will be addressed and suggestions made to mitigate them. Lastly, Section 5
will draw some conclusions.
2. The protection of the public core of the internet: a call for norms
In March 2015, the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy published a
report entitled The Public Core of the Internet: An International Agenda for Internet Govern-
ance. This report called for the establishment of an international norm stipulating that the
internet’s public core – its main protocols and infrastructure, which are a global public
good – must be safeguarded against unwarranted intervention by states. This global
public good does not comprise the whole of the internet or even enter into the
content layer of the internet but is limited to the logical and physical infrastructural
layers of the core internet. It is deliberately a ‘lowest common denominator approach’
that aims to keep the concept of the public core as close as possible to the minimum
that is needed to protect the functionality of the internet. This minimalist approach
should help secure as much international support for this norm of non-intervention as
possible. Support would have to be grounded in a common understanding that safeguard-
ing the integrity and functionality of the core internet is in the interest of all countries that
have digitised their economy, government and society. Their common digital vulnerability
and need for a functional internet to sustain growth and innovation should underpin their
interest in collectively protecting the core of the internet and should transcend their many
other political differences in internet-related issues. In this sense, the public core debate
relates to the internet fragmentation debate. The wide array of forms of internet fragmen-
tation that Drake, Cerf, and Kleinwächter (2016) outline in their overview for the World
Economic Forum lists many forms of internet fragmentation that do not interfere with
the public core of the internet. Some deeper forms of fragmentation however – such as
interference with the root zone or data localisation that require changes in routing proto-
cols – may damage the functioning of the public core. As every national digital economy,
society and government ultimately rests on top of the public core, its functionality and
integrity is indispensable for digital survival and growth. The protection of this global
public good, therefore, aligns with the national interest and could be considered an
‘extended national interest’ (Broeders 2015, 42–43). The national interest thus aligns
with the protection of the global public good.
Since publication, the idea of the public core has gained traction. In 2016 the Internet
Society (ISOC) published a beta version of its Policy framework for an open and trusted Inter-
net in which it states that the technical community shares ‘a sense of collective steward-
ship towards the public core of the Internet and the open standards on which its
technologies and networks are based’ (ISOC 2016, 8). Also in 2016, the Global Commission
on Internet Governance (the Bildt Commission) published its final report called One Inter-
net, which included a policy recommendation that resonates with the idea of the































protection of the public core: ‘Consistent with the recognition that parts of the Internet
constitute a global public good, the commission urges member states of the United
Nations to agree not to use cyber weapons against core infrastructure of the Internet’
(Global Commission on Internet Governance 2016, 75, see also 58). In 2017 the Dutch gov-
ernment made the protection of the public core of the internet a cornerstone of its Inter-
national Cyber Strategy:
The economic and social advantages associated with the internet require the ‘public core’ of
the internet to function in a reliable, predictable, stable and safe way. This core possesses
elements of an international public good that transcends individual sovereign and private
interests. The Netherlands recognises that, given our dependence on the internet, it is necess-
ary to exercise restraint when engaging in activities that can affect that public core. (Govern-
ment of the Netherlands 2017, 5)
The Dutch government has submitted a proposal for such a norm to the deliberations of the
2016–2017 UNGroup of Governmental Experts (UNGGE) and aims to pursue the establishment
of such a norm in other international fora as well. Most recently, in June 2017 the Global Com-
mission on the Stability of Cyberspace, in some regards the successor of the Global Commission
on Internet Governance, held its first full commission meeting in Tallinn and put the issue of
protecting the public core of the internet at the top of its research agenda.1
3. From concept to norm
The 2015 report did not contain a blueprint of the public core of the internet. While it
identified key parts of the logical and technical infrastructure as being part of the core,
the report allowed for ambiguity in certain areas. After all, determining what is and
what is not covered by the concept will influence the extent to which states and other
parties see it as being aligned with their own (national) interests. The more it limits
itself to the minimum requirements for the internet to function, the easier it is to get
broad political support for a norm of non-intervention. Demarcating the edges of the
concept and turning it into language fit for international diplomatic use requires consul-
tation with other parties, such as the technical community, civil society and state represen-
tatives from various corners of the globe.
In discussions with various stakeholders since publication of the report, two basic
approaches emerged with regard to determining what the public core ‘is’, or better, what
is understood to be covered by the concept. Neither of these approaches cast the
concept in iron as the technological development of the internet is neither finished nor pre-
dictable: it is always possible that new protocols and infrastructures emerge that should be
considered part of the public core. The concept requires some degree of flexibility. The first
approach to defining the public core is layered. There are three basic layers – logical, physical
and organisational – that have elements that may be considered part of the core:
(1) The logical infrastructure (TCP/IP, DNS, routing protocols…)
(2) The physical infrastructure (DNS servers, sea cables…)
(3) The organisational infrastructure (internet exchanges, CERTs…)
In this approach, it is evident that key elements of the logical and physical infrastructure
































TCP/IP, DNS and routing are included even within the most limited definition of the
concept. However, other protocols could be considered as well. The physical infrastructure
is more complicated due to issues with sovereignty that will be discussed later. The organ-
isational level is also complicated, even though there is some precedent for naming organ-
isations that should be exempt from state interference in the cyber domain. The 2015 UN
GGE consensus report emphasised that states should not attack the CERT of another
country nor use their own CERT(s) to attack a country (UN 2015, 8, art. 13.k). It is a most
basic attempt by the participating states to separate organisations that are responsible
for internet security – i.e. the security and functionality of the internet as a network –
from organisations that are responsible for national security (Broeders 2015, 96–98). The
former may be considered to be part of the public core.
The second approach to defining the public core is functional. Instead of listing what
should or should not belong to the public core of the internet, it emphasises what the
core of the internet does and stipulates that this should not be interfered with by
states. This approach came up during a 2016 workshop that the Dutch Ministry of
Foreign Affairs organised to prepare the Dutch position on the public core of the internet
for the 2016–2017 round of the UN GGE. In this meeting – which included representatives
from the technical community and NGOs from various countries of the world – protection
of the public core was defined as the protection of the general availability and integrity of
the core forwarding and naming functions of the global internet.2 Obviously, this
approach does not fully eliminate the need to determine what the vital components of
the core forwarding and naming functions are, as it implicitly points towards core
naming and numbering protocols (IP and DNS) and routing protocols, such as BGP, and
perhaps also the tier one submarine cable infrastructure. This language does, however,
facilitate a different conversation about setting a norm to protect that global functionality
from unwarranted state intervention.
Lastly, it is worth noting that diplomatic terminology does not always require razor-
sharp definitions that are universally ascribed to in order to be useful and successful.
Some concepts prove to be useful even if they are under-defined. For example, the UN
GGE uses the term ‘critical infrastructure’ repeatedly in its 2015 consensus report even
though it provides no definition. Moreover, the drafters were undoubtedly well aware
of the wide variety among the participating states in what they understand to be critical
infrastructure. The concept of the public core of the internet – the global critical infrastruc-
ture underlying most national critical infrastructures – could very well function in a similar
manner. Getting the concept into diplomatic play may initially be more important than its
precise demarcation. The interaction between diplomatic norms and real-life events may
also shape the particulars over the course of years.
4. Aligning the protection of public core of the internet with sovereignty
and national security
The idea of the public core of the internet has been questioned mostly from the perspec-
tive of national security. Bringing the global internet ‘in line’ with the international system
of sovereign states is an ongoing process in which national security actors tend to empha-
sise national sovereignty over (parts of) the internet and downplay its international char-
acter and functionality. Even though national security actors are usually not against a































functioning internet in itself, there are also pressures and temptations to use the internet in
an instrumental way to forward national security goals. This is the difference between what
DeNardis (2012, 726) calls the ‘governance of the internet infrastructure’ in which the inter-
ests of the internet as an infrastructure prevail, and ‘governance using the internet infrastruc-
ture’, in which national policy goals dominate and the internet infrastructure is considered
instrumental towards achieving them. To national security communities, the internet is both
a source of threat as well as an opportunity to build new capabilities for intelligence-gather-
ing and warfare. To some extent states already shape the internet into a version that aligns
with their political views and interests – the Chinese internet differs from the UK internet –
indicating a fragmentation of the world wide web that is mostly located at the content level
but is operated through the lower technical levels. However important these modifications
are in terms of the political and public sphere on the internet, this ‘Westphalianising’ of the
internet (Demchak and Dombrowksi 2011) does not necessarily damage the public core.
Other state interventions on and in the internet can, however, damage the public core of
the internet, creating (unforeseen) effects that will damage or compromise the availability
and integrity of the core forwarding and naming functions. As such they are considered
‘unwarranted interventions by states’ that are declared off limits by the proposed norm
for the protection of the public core of the internet.
The rules of the road for state behaviour in cyberspace are, however, far from fully crys-
tallised. The fact that the 2016–2017 round of the UN GGE failed to produce a consensus
report is a pertinent illustration. The formal point of departure is that international law
applies online as it does offline (Schmitt 2013; UN 2015) – although reportedly that prin-
ciple was also a key disagreement in the most recent UN GGE (Sukumar 2017) – but that
does not cover all real-life situations in cyberspace. This is in itself the basis of the norms
process: one of its aims is to clarify larger (legal) principles and translate them into rules of
the road and confidence-building measures. Moreover, state interventions in the infra-
structure and logical layers of the core internet – sanctioned by declaring cyber the
‘fifth domain of warfare’ – are in constant development and our guide to understanding
the means and methods that states employ in this domain are primarily documents leaked
by whistle-blowers and what is revealed through the digital forensics of private cyberse-
curity companies, academics and NGOs. State programmes, methods and capabilities for
operating in cyberspace tend to develop fast and in secrecy. This burdens the norms
process with a fast-moving target.
The development of cyber norms will be dynamic and evolve over time, and the exact
scope and content will differ in various fora. Finnemore and Hollis (2016, 477), therefore,
argue that the norms process is in important ways the product when it comes to cyber
norms. This also goes for the protection of the public core which engages with several
debates in cybersecurity and internet governance. Since publication of the report, the
argument for establishing an international norm for the protection of the public core of
the internet has been questioned on two related grounds: its tension with sovereignty
and its tension with national security. Both objections will be addressed below.
4.1. The public core of the internet and the sovereignty objection
The sovereignty objection runs as follows. The widely-held idea that the internet is a truly
































other technical infrastructure that rests somewhere on or under the ground of a sovereign
nation. It is territorial. The internet is, therefore, embedded in sovereign nations, covered
by national legal systems and as such, is not a global public good.
The counterargument runs as follows. The public core includes both core logical and
core technical infrastructure of the global internet. In the logical layer – the protocols
and standards that make naming and forwarding possible – the argument of territoriality
does not apply. Protocols and standards are not territorial in any real sense and, therefore,
it would be hard to apply the concept of sovereignty to them. The distribution of critical
internet resources – IP addresses and domain names, also known as the IANA function
– has some elements of being subject to sovereignty as they are formally distributed by
ICANN under Californian law, but the operation of the core protocols such as TCP/IP
and DNS is not subject to sovereignty. However, at the level of the physical infrastructure,
the argument of territoriality does hold for much of the core infrastructure. DNS servers are
located within national borders and sea cables come ashore in sovereign nations. The
question is whether that means that sovereignty should be applied without any limits
on what governments can and cannot do with them.
As these core infrastructures facilitate the flow of global internet traffic, one could argue
that intervening in them can have such adverse effects in other countries that it would
create obligations for the first state to show restraint. For example, if the United States
were for political reasons to force Verisign, the company that operates the root zone, to
block an entire top-level domain such as .ir for Iran, the repercussions could be global.3
Another fictional example would be the Dutch government shutting down the Amsterdam
Internet Exchange (AMS-IX) which would have repercussions far beyond Dutch borders.
The same would go for the blocking of submarine internet cables that connect the con-
tinents – especially since they come ashore in a fairly limited number of countries and
locations. The fact that internet topography does not align with national borders
implies that hard cuts in core infrastructure – located in a sovereign nation – will
usually be felt transnationally.
How the resulting transboundary harms should be characterised in terms of inter-
national law or international norms is less clear. It might constitute an international wrong-
ful act if the results violate obligations under international law, such as perhaps the
International Telecommunication Union provisions on ‘avoiding harmful interference’ in
other signatory states’ communication networks’ and/or the general obligation to ‘avoid
technical harm to the telecommunication facilities of third countries’ (Rutkowski 2011,
18–19). It might also be covered under the notion of the ‘no harm principle’ that comes
from environmental law but may turn out to be applicable in the cyber domain as well
(Shackelford, Russell, and Kuehn 2016), or the notion of due diligence that is still very
much under debate in the international law of cyberspace (Schmitt 2017, 11–13). All of
these would create an obligation for the state to self-limit its sovereignty with regard to
those physical elements of the public core of the internet that are within its territory.
A useful analogy to the organisation of such sovereign self-restraint might be with
shared resources such as rivers. Even though no one disputes that the river Rhine runs
through the sovereign territories of Switzerland, Germany, France, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands, the application of sovereignty to the water flowing through this river is
more problematic. The downstream effects of, for example, dumping toxins into the
water are so severe that they have become subject to international norms that aim to































govern the joint stewardship of rivers, such as the 2004 Berlin Rules on Water Resources.
These lay down rules and restrictions for states in both peace and wartime with regard to
internationally shared water resources such as rivers that flow through multiple countries.
Even though the international frameworks are not legally binding (Salman 2007), the fra-
mework governing the joint stewardship of the Rhine is. Cooperation between the signa-
tory states is laid down in the Convention for the Protection of the Rhine – and
administered and overseen by the International Commission for the Protection of the
Rhine – and is also covered by the European Water Framework Directive.4 In other
words, states have chosen to set themselves norms that limit their sovereignty in recog-
nition of the fact that the river constitutes an international shared resource. This could
be a viable model to mediate between the need to protect the public core of the internet
on the one hand and the concept of sovereignty on the other.
4.2. The public core and the national security objection
The national security objection runs as follows. Cyberspace is a source of threat to national
security – hostile actors using the internet, vulnerable critical infrastructures, etc. – and at
the same time presents an opportunity to build military and intelligence capabilities. High-
end military and intelligence capabilities in cyberspace give some states a strategic advan-
tage in relation to less-advanced nations (see for example Lewis 2011, 57–58). Currently,
there are no norms prohibiting the build-up of cyber capabilities or the use of the
logical and physical core internet infrastructure as a target or a carrier for an attack. There-
fore, it makes perfect sense to build up capabilities in cyber space and it makes no sense to
subscribe to a norm of non-intervention when there is no certainty that other states will
adhere to such a norm. The state that does limit itself will create its own strategic disad-
vantage to those states that do not subscribe to the norm or even those that subscribe to
the norm but do not act accordingly. In other words: states that are the first movers on
such a norm will damage their national security.
The counterargument is that national security can be threatened in more ways than
one and that these require different, even contrary, responses. In International Relations
theory the concept of the security dilemma is well known. A security dilemma exists
when ‘many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security, decrease the secur-
ity of others’ (Jervis 1978, 169). And how those others react to their decreased security can,
in turn, decrease the security of the first state. In other words, building up offensive capa-
bilities to protect yourself may spiral into an arms race that results in less individual and
collective security. In that light, it is important to note that cyber conflicts are often con-
sidered extremely escalatory conflicts.5 The potential for a conflict to spin out of control is
huge in the cyber domain and this may easily drag countries into a higher level of conflict
than intended.
Cybersecurity lends itself well to the dynamics of the security dilemma. The number of
states that are on record as building up military cyber capacity is growing steadily and it is
safe to assume that not all states are open about their investments, capabilities and inten-
tions. Moreover, many countries will have upgraded their technical cyber capacity con-
siderably within a few years from now, giving a much larger group of states capacities
that are currently reserved for only a few superpowers. What is considered cutting edge
































insecure landscape (Broeders 2015, 94). The blurring of lines between cyber intelligence
operations and cyber offensive operations, further, exacerbates uncertainty and the pos-
sibilities for misreading the other’s intentions (Broeders 2017). Some authors are, there-
fore, talking about the emergence of a cybersecurity dilemma (Dunn Cavelty 2014;
Buchanon (2017). Given these dynamics, it is not surprising that the debate about
norms for state behaviour in cyber space goes hand in hand with the debate about con-
fidence-building measures to decrease the possibilities for misreading state behaviour
(Lewis 2011, 57–58).
There are no easy answers to national security in the cyber age, but it seems evident
that the risks to national security associated with self-limitation when others may defect
from such a norm have to be weighed against the risks of the cybersecurity dilemma
and the escalation of cyber conflict. As Schmitt argues, ‘Legal clarity breeds international
stability’ (Schmitt 2017, 21). Reducing ambiguity in cyberspace – even though it harbours
temptations of short term strategic advantages – is to the benefit of all states. Lifting the
public core of the internet out of that ambiguity would be a good starting point.
5. Summary and conclusion
The call to establish an international norm to protect the public core of the internet, as
originally advocated by the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy, has
been taken up in various forms in various fora. Translating the concept into a viable inter-
national norm is an ongoing process that requires specifications of the concept and should
also answer some of the objections that have been raised since publication in 2015. This
article proposes two possible approaches to defining the public core of the internet: a
layered approach and a functional approach. Both provide productive ways to discuss
safeguarding the functionality and integrity of the core logical and physical infrastructure
of the internet. However, it is also important to recognise that diplomatic terminology
does not always require definitions that are universally ascribed to in order to be useful
and successful. The unproblematic and productive use of ‘critical infrastructures’ in the
context of the UN GGE is a case in point.
This article further discusses two objections to the concept of the public core of the
internet from the perspectives of (1) state sovereignty and (2) national security. The sover-
eignty objection, reasoning that core internet infrastructure is covered by territorial sover-
eignty and is, therefore, not global in a legal sense, can be overcome by focusing on
potential transboundary harms that may result from interference with the public core
and may create obligations for states. The article discusses the model of the norms and
laws for the joint stewardship of rivers such as the Rhine as a way to reconcile the simul-
taneous territorial and transboundary character of the core of the internet. The national
security objection, reasoning that a state that subscribes to a norm that calls for self-
restraint when others may not subscribe will damage its national security, should be medi-
tated by taking into account the parallel risk of an emerging cyber security dilemma. These
different risks to national security have to be weighed against each other and – given that
cyber capabilities are likely to spread to a much larger group of states quite fast – the best
route to international stability, in the long run, will go through increased legal clarity about
responsible state behaviour. The route to that legal clarity will have to be paved by a
dynamic, multi-forum norms process.































Obviously, states debating norms in international fora cover only one inroad into the
issue of international stability in cyberspace and the protection of the public core.
Van Eeten and Mueller (2013) in the context of the academic literature on internet govern-
ance noted a preoccupation with official organisations such as ICANN, the Internet Gov-
ernance Forum (IGF) and the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) at the
expense of many other structures and venues – such as net neutrality, content filtering,
the economics of cybersecurity – where much of the actual governance takes place. Simi-
larly, when it comes to the protection of the public core of the internet the actions and
preferences of the corporate world – for example in advocating the use of internet infra-
structure for copyright enforcement – and the actions of non-governmental actors –
sometimes serving as proxies for states – will also help determine what is possible and
impossible. Also, other fora than those sanctioned by the UN system may prove important
to test the waters and build much-needed coalitions that are broader than like-minded
countries. From a national diplomatic perspective, there is no reason – other than
resources – for any state to limit its efforts to enhance stability and security in cyberspace
to the usual intergovernmental fora (Broeders 2015, 89–105).
Realistically, states do not just develop norms around a negotiation table. Often norms
simply ‘emerge’ through state behaviour in real life. Especially large and powerful states
sometimes send a message of ‘do as I say, not as I do’ when their diplomatic statements
and behaviour are at odds with each other. This underlines both the limitation and the
necessity of a norms process. It is limited because norms do not legally bind states. It is
necessary because legal norms are not a viable option at this moment and the norms
process does create a normative benchmark where previously there was none to chal-
lenge state behaviour when it violates a norm. It is inevitably a process of small steps
and setbacks. The most recent setback has been the failure of the last round of the UN
GGE to deliver a consensus report, leading some commentators to speak of ‘the end of
an era’.6 The cyber norms process is broader than the UN GGE, however. The Tallinn
Manual Process that focused on the question of how existing international law applies
to cyberspace is not a state-run process and is not legally binding. However, if only by
being the most solid piece of internationally collaborative thinking that is available on
the issue, it does serve as an important benchmark for state and military lawyers and as
such shapes the debate. The norms process may develop further at the level of regional
international organisations and through the work of independent, hybrid commissions
such as the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace that has taken the issue
of the protection of the public core of the internet on board, before it resurfaces at the
global political level of the UN.
Notes
1. https://cyberstability.org/news/the-global-commission-on-the-stability-of-cyberspace-holds-
first-full-commission-meeting-in-tallinn/. The commission at that time also issued a call for
proposals on its first research programme on the public core of the interment, calling for
reproach proposals on: (1) Defining the Public core of the Internet, (2) Identifying Internet-
Accessible Critical Information Infrastructures, (3) Overview of Cyber Diplomatic Initiatives,
(4) Overview of Cyber Norms in Theory and Practice and (5) Protecting the Core.

































3. This would require deep interference with the DNS Root Zone generation and signing process
that takes place at Verisign as operator of the root zone. The efficacy of the measure would
depend on the pervasiveness of DNSSEC: without pervasive DNSSEC validation, DNS operators
might continue to serve stale data. With DNSSEC, stale data would be invalidated at signature
expiration time. Regardless, the action would cause the need for various DNS operators across
the world to take conscious action to route around such interference.
4. See: http://www.iksr.org/en/index.html
5. Jason Healey’s testimony before the United States House of Representatives Committee on
Armed Services Hearing on ‘Cyber Warfare in the 21st Century: Threats, Challenges, and
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